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Abstract
Although a tribute to Jean-Claude Piris could easily stretch through the whole spectrum of
European Union law-which broadened in part thanks to his active contribution over the twenty-
year term when he served as Legal Adviser to the Council of the European Union, the European
Council, and several intergovernmental conferences for the reform of the treaties-it is appropriate
to devote the following lines to the theme of institutional strengthening, which always attracted
his consideration and thinking and to which he contributed some illuminating and forward-looking
writings; and it is tempting to do so in the light of a specific feature that presently keeps him busy
as a Senior Fellow in New York: “Two-Speed Europe.”
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"How can we ensure that 'more' does not lead to 'less"'? I
"Such an expanded Union would defy the comprehension of the founding
fathers such as Jean Monnet. The micro-reforms currently under
discussion in the EU on the size of the Commission, and the voting
weights of the 15 members states, might help to accommodate up to five
new members. But much deeper reforms would be required to manage
greater diversity. "2
INTRODUCTION
Enlargement of the European Union ("EU" or "Union") to
include Central and Eastern Europe countries ceased to be an
option twenty years ago-the European Union was still the
* Director, Legal Service, Council of the European Union. The views expressed are
the author's alone and do not commit in any way either the Council or its Legal Service.
1. Report Prepared for the European Council, on Europe and the Challenge of
Enlargement, 25 E.C. BULL., no. 3, supp. (1992) [hereinafter Challenge of
Enlargement].
2. Lionel Barber, Uniting the States of Europe, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 29, 1999, at
12.
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European Communities-when the Berlin Wall crumbled down.
At that moment enlargement became a must, a political
necessity, with the only options left being when and how.
Jacques Delors, then president of the European
Commission, had started very early in the 1990s to warn about
the possible implications of enlargement on the institutional
system that had been conceived in the founding treaties forty
years earlier and had hardly been adapted ever since. He had
pointed to the expected enlargement to Austria, Finland,
Norway, and Sweden, and to the next one to follow, possibly
involving over ten countries. Since 1992, he had been calling in
particular for a strengthening of the institutional system as a
precondition for any further widening of the Union.
Twenty years later, discussions about adapting the Union's
institutions have (provisionally) closed with the entry into force
of the Lisbon Treaty. In the meantime, Europe has changed, and
the European Union has changed with it: its membership has
grown of course (twice as many!). The Union is not the same as it
was, in the way it acts-or reacts to external events (consider the
debate on the intervention in Iraq)-as well as in the way it sets
its priorities (consider the issue of refugee landing in the
Mediterranean EU countries) and reaches compromises. There is
no surprise about that: a club of twenty-seven cannot possibly be
as like-minded as a club of six.
This Essay assumes that the European Union had no other
choice than to accept the political necessity of enlargement. That
being so, one could certainly not expect things to be the same
after the biggest enlargement of the Union and the introduction
of a single currency, indeed the biggest events in the Union's
history. It may, however, be argued that enlargement could have
been better prepared and managed, not least had Jacques
Delors' warnings been followed by appropriate action. And it is
fair to question whether due consideration has been given to the
impact of the growing and diversifying membership on the
European integration model.
Is it too late though? It would no doubt be more difficult to
do now what has not been done over the past twenty years to
make the Union's institutions more effective, assuming that there
continues to be a political will to do so, at a time when the
general attitude toward the European Union is shifting in many
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Member States. However, strengthening the institutions-as well
as explaining better what they do and why they do it-remains a
priority if the Union is to live up to its challenges and progress
further. Should that not prove possible, the alternative option in
the short term might well be for some like-minded Member
States to take a different route, creating a "pioneer group" to
move ahead toward greater integration, a sort of "return to the
origins" option.
Although a tribute to Jean-Claude Piris could easily stretch
through the whole spectrum of European Union law-which
broadened in part thanks to his active contribution over the
twenty-year term when he served as Legal Adviser to the Council
of the European Union, the European Council, and several
intergovernmental conferences for the reform of the treaties-it
is appropriate to devote the following lines to the theme of
institutional strengthening, which always attracted his
consideration and thinking and to which he contributed some
illuminating and forward-looking writings; and it is tempting to
do so in the light of a specific feature that presently keeps him
busy as a Senior Fellow in New York: "Two-Speed Europe."
I. THE STARTING POINT: IF YOU HAVE TO ENLARGE, MAKE
SURE TO KEEP STRONG
Enlargement to the Central and Eastern Europe countries in
the early 1990s was not an option; the Madrid European Council,
in December 1995, defined it as a "political necessity and a
"historic opportunity."3 Reaching out to European countries that
had struggled for democracy was felt as a duty by the European
Union, as the Communities had felt, twenty years earlier, that the
prospect for European integration was the natural way out of
dictatorship to show to Greece, Portugal, and Spain. And after
all-as Frangois Mitterrand had forcefully reminded in a historic
address to the last meeting of the European Council he attended,
in Essen, on December 10, 1994, which heads of candidate
countries also attended-those countries were "not less
3. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION 1995, at 3 (1995).
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European than us"4 and therefore not less entitled to sit at that
table than the members of the European Union.
So, enlargement was not an option: everybody knew in the
early 1990s, that it needed to happen, the only options being the
timing and modalities; in other words, how best to make it
happen. Equally, everybody knew from the beginning that
enlargement on such a large scale-adding fifteen new countries
to the twelve signatories of the Maastricht Treaty-would
inevitably change the nature of the European Union, making it a
less cohesive club. Although that prospect could look more
welcome to some than to others, the Union was not going to be
the same anymore.
For that reason, the debate had focused very early on the
need to make the Union stronger before-or in preparation
for-its enlargement. Jacques Delors had repeatedly warned,
since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, about the need to
strengthen the Union as a condition for enlargement, and he
presented a Commission report to the Lisbon European Council
in June 1992 entitled Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement,
which was added to the presidency conclusions.5 And when the
Copenhagen European Council in June 1993 set the conditions
for the candidate countries to meet to be able to join the Union,
the need was felt to specify that "the Union's capacity to absorb
new members, while maintaining the momentum of European
integration" was also an important element to take into
consideration, in the interest of the Union and of the candidate
countries as well.6
Why was that need felt in particular? And why was such an
emphasis put on strengthening the European "building" before
launching any further construction works? To answer that
question, one has to ask whether there is a point at which
European integration cannot bear further enlargement; in other
words, can European integration-which is a process involving by
definition "an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe,"
while being open to any European state sharing the Union's
values-proceed unimpeded notwithstanding the number of
4. Author's personal recollection.
5. Challenge of Enlargement, supra note 1.
6. Copenhagen European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, 26 E.C. BULL.,
no. 6 (1993).
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participants? The answer should be affirmative, theoretically.
Practice, however, is another story.
As Jean-Claude Piris stressed on several occasions, the
European Union is "a partially federal entity"7 : it cannot be
compared to-and is not meant to be-a federal state, nor can it
be classified as a classical international organization. Its specific
features date back from the original treaties and were
consolidated over the years. Those specific features-namely its
supranational character and its legal order-and the very nature
of the European Union itself have, despite the criticism to which
they may often give rise, attracted new applications from
countries wishing tojoin, and continue to do so.
Understandably, therefore, strengthening before bringing in
new members has been, from the beginning, a Union concern
and a way to preserve those features. Thus, the doors were finally
opened to the United Kingdom's entry, after two failed attempts
and only after the six original Member States agreed, at the
Hague summit in December 1969, to "relaunch" the European
project under the French-sponsored triple heading of
achievement, consolidation, and enlargement, which notably
included agreements on financing the Common Agricultural
Policy, on establishing Community Own Resources, on
strengthening the European Parliament's budgetary powers, and
on economic and monetary cooperation.8 Similarly, Portugal and
Spain only joined the European Communities fifteen years later,
after the Single European Act was concluded, which further
strengthened Community powers by enlarging the areas of its
competences and providing its institutions with the means to act
effectively in that respect. But what about the latest
enlargements?
If the Maastricht Treaty may still be regarded as providing,
in turn, a basis for the newly established European Union to
welcome four (in the end, actually three) new European Free
Trade Association ("EFTA") states in the mid-1990s, one must
admit that the subsequent and long-advocated strengthening of
the Union with the prospect of adding Central and Eastern
7. SeeJean-Claude Piris, The European Union: Towards a New Form of Federalism?, in
PATFERNS OF REGIONALISM AND FEDERALISM: LESSONS FOR THE UK 69, 78-87 (J6rg
Fedtke & Basil S. Markesinis eds., 2006).
8. The Hague Summit, 3 E.C. BULL., no. 1, at 16-26 (1970).
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European countries actually never happened. The institutional
adaptations that the Maastricht European Council mandated the
next intergovernmental conference to adopt could not be agreed
upon, neither within the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty9 nor, three
years later, at the hard-fought Nice European Council, which
signed off on the 2001 Nice Treaty. And, although the Lisbon
Treaty finally retained-in December 2007, once the Union had
already been twice enlarged-most of the substance of the failed
Constitutional Treaty, it only partially answered the question
whether the Union was equipped at last to safely stand the
challenge of nearly doubling its membership. Indeed, several
relevant issues were either left unaddressed or hardly given a
proper solution as negotiations evolved. It remains to be seen, for
example, whether the new "double majority" voting system,
which would only apply as of 2014, will allow the enlarged Union
to act effectively. And, last but not least, answers have yet to be
provided regarding how best to explain to an enlarged Union's
citizens what the European Union is about, how it functions, and
how it is relevant to their everyday lives.
In the end, almost twenty years after the Delors Commission
submitted its report on enlargement to the Lisbon European
Council, one cannot really say that things have changed, apart
from the fact that the Union's membership has, in the meantime,
more than doubled. Despite the European Council's
reaffirmation, in June 2006, of the importance of "ensur[ing] in
future that the Union is able to function politically, financially
and institutionally as it enlarges, and to further deepen Europe's
9. Belgium, France, and Italy entered a declaration for the Amsterdam Final Act
stating that the treaty did not meet the need for substantial progress toward reinforcing
the institutions and that such reinforcement was an indispensable condition for the
conclusion of the first accession negotiations. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the
Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and
Certain Related Acts, Declaration by Belgium, France and Italy on the Protocol on the
Institutions with the Prospect of Enlargement of the European Union, 1997 0.J. C
340/1, at 144. In a comment on the future of Europe written for the LONDON FINANCIAL
TIMES in the last days of 1999, Lionel Barber-who, a few years earlier, had been the
newspaper's Brussels correspondent-took the view that "the planned enlargement of
the European Union to the east and to the south will force the pace of political reform,"
noting that " [s]uch an expanded Union would defy the comprehension of the founding
fathers." Barber, supra note 2. Referring to the envisaged changes in the size of the
Commission and to the voting system in the Council, he then found that "much deeper
reforms would be required to manage greater diversity." Id.
UNION IN THE ENLARGED EU?
common project,"10 no clear action has been taken to make sure
that the Union can continue, with a larger number of members,
to function on as solid bases and as effectively as it did twenty
years ago. Additionally, no real effort has been made to explain
the European project to the public, despite the alarm bells
periodically ringing since the Danish referendum of 1992. As a
consequence, indifference and even distrust toward that project
kept growing in the Member States.
On the other hand, the size of the European Union has
almost doubled over the last six years, and the way to perceive
European integration is less and less commonly shared
throughout it. Can this be redressed? It can, although it may
prove very difficult given the apparent lack of any political will to
do so. If it cannot, however, there may be a good case to accept
that, in a larger European Union, integration cannot continue to
mean the same thing to everybody, and move forward
accordingly.
The two options considered below are both state-driven
options. Whether it is improving the institutions' functioning,
possibly through additional treaty amendments, or creating a
"pioneer group" of like-minded Member States to push ahead
for greater integration by making a new treaty, either option
presupposes a process that must be launched and conducted by
Member States.
One could argue that another way exists, which could be
opened by the development of a political "consciousness" in all
Member States and the formation of a political arena where
issues of European relevance would be debated and political
options (on climate change, immigration, or delocalization)
confronted. This could in turn lead to a political confrontation
between European political parties within the framework of a
truly European-based campaign for the election to the European
Parliament (as such a confrontation has never taken place),
determine the appointment of the Commission on a political
platform (which has never happened, despite timid attempts),
and ultimately influence the positions that representatives of
Member States are daily called to take as members of the
Council, thereby bridging the gap between the political debates
10. Brussels European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, E.U. BULL., no. 6, at
16 (2006).
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at the European level and at each Member State level. All of this
might generate a peoples-driven move toward further European
integration, one in which the European Parliament (and the
European political parties represented therein) would then play
its normal role. As things are now, however, it is fair to assume
that any possible movement toward a change-whatever it is-in
the European Union integration process can only be state driven.
II. OPTION ONE: BETTER LATE THAN NEVER-KEEP
INSTITUTIONS FUNCTIONING
European integration was always meant to be a political
project. It has been so since the founding fathers' functionalist
approach opened the way to the European Communities, and it
developed with the same political vision in the 1990s through the
establishment of the European Union. If the political system
resulting from that project is to keep its original features in a
Union of twenty-seven or more, rather than turning into
something of a lesser ambition, Member States need to ensure
that institutions are still able to function efficiently to cope with
growing global challenges. In that respect, the creation of a
permanent chair for the European Council' and of a High
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2 with an
embryonic diplomatic service,13 are steps forward, which are also
meant to enhance the visibility of EU institutions. In a larger
Union, however, the Council and the Commission also need to
keep working efficiently, and the European political system needs
a firmer rooting in the Member States, to bridge the gap with
citizens. The former could hardly happen without a simpler
decision-making system in the Council and a substantially
slimmer Commission; the latter is badly needed if one wishes to
repair the damage, caused over two decades, to popular
legitimacy of the Union, which can be achieved only through
better links with national parliaments.
11. The President is elected by the European Council for a term of two and one-
half years, renewable once. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art.
15(5), 2010 0.J. C 83/01, at 23 [hereinafter TEU post-Lisbon].
12. See id. art. 18, at 26.
13. See id. art. 27(3), at 32.
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A. Reforming Institutions at Last
Safeguarding the Union's capacity to act efficiently
presupposes efficient institutions, particularly the Commission
and the Council. To that end, the Convention on the Future of
Europe and the ensuing intergovernmental conferences had
gone the right way; however, that way was somehow lost as
negotiations unfolded, and should be found again.
A streamlined Commission, with a substantially smaller
number of members than the number of Member States, has
been on the agenda of four intergovernmental conferences. No
doubt it is a most sensitive issue, and it is perfectly legitimate for
Member States to feel comfortable only insofar as they have a
national seated at the Commission's table. One should not
forget, however, the impact on the Commission's capacity to
fulfill its mission. And if it is true that a management board can
only remain effective insofar as all the board members can look
into each other's eyes across the table, then one is bound to
conclude that the Commission's size is already overstretched.
Moreover, the principle of independence of Commission
members should be kept in mind, at a time when the number of
those members equals the number of Member States, thus
making the former look like representatives of the latter, and the
Commission resembles more and more an intergovernmental
assembly rather than an executive organ. Although it can be
argued that institutions are what people make of them (and one
unfortunately cannot expect to have a Hallstein or Delors every
five years), it is also true that size matters.
After pointless discussions at Amsterdam and Nice on the
issue of reducing the number of Commission members, an
agreement had been reached in the Treaty Establishing a
Constitution for Europe. The Lisbon Treaty subsequently
confirmed that the Commission shall consist of a number of
members corresponding to two-thirds of the Union's
membership based on a system of equal rotation between
Member States.14 However, that decision, which was only due to
14. See id. art. 17(5), at 25. That was without prejudice to the need for the
Commission to keep in close touch with the realities and needs of each Member State, as
stressed in Declaration 10 to the Lisbon Final Act. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the
Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community,
Declaration on Article 9 D of the Treaty on European Union, 2007 O.J. C 306/1, at 254.
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take effect in 2014, was a source of concern for several Member
States who would not be unhappy to stay with the status quo. In
light of the failed Irish referendum of June 12, 2008-which
appeared to also be due to the electorate concerns about the
future composition of the Commission-the European Council,
while reaffirming that "the Treaty of Lisbon is considered
necessary in order to help the enlarged Union to function more
efficiently," agreed that "a decision will be taken, in accordance
with the necessary legal procedures, to the effect that the
Commission shall continue to include one national of each
Member State,"15 thus setting aside, for the sake of the treaty
entering into force, the compromise signed in Lisbon.
As for the Council, it needs to remain capable of reaching
decisions without being constantly exposed to the risk of paralysis
and of efficiently preparing those decisions. That implies simpler
decision making, involving both simple rules on the double-
majority voting-and possibly a lesser scope for vetoing
decisions-and a less burdensome way of conducting business
around the Council table. Concerning the latter, one does not
need to look very far for recommendations and concrete
measures to improve the functioning of the Council in an
enlarged Union. The so-called Trumpf/Piris report of March
1999 contained a few recommendations concerning the
organization and conduct of meetings, some of which were
transposed into the Council Rules of procedure or simply turned
into practice, while others still await implementation. 16
Simpler decision making was at hand for a while in 2004. A
new system of majority voting had been agreed upon, at last, in
the Constitutional Treaty. This system called for a majority (fifty-
five percent) of states and for a majority (sixty-five percent) of
the Union's population.17 The negotiations that resumed after
15. Brussels European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, E.U. BULL., no. 12,
at 8 (2008).
16. Council of the European Union, Operation of the Council with an Enlarged
Union in Prospect, SN 2139/99 (Mar. 10, 1999), available at http://www.
consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms-data/docs/pressdata/en/misc/0 2 139.EN9.htm. The
operational recommendations stemming from that report were approved by the
European Council in December 1999 and attached to the conclusions thereof. Helsinki
European Council, Presidency Conclusions, E.U. BULL., no. 12, at 17 (1999).
17. Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe art. 24(1), 2004 O.J. C
310/1, at 19 (never ratified).
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the failed referenda, however, brought about a more
complicated mechanism, which was approved at Lisbon.'8
In order to increase the efficiency of the Union's decision
making, the double-majority voting system-a system that
embodies the double legitimacy of the Council-should be
implemented immediately (rather than wait for three or even six
more years of transition), and it should be stripped of all
qualifications and conditions that make it difficult to operate and
understand. It would thus be an easy majority system to use and
to explain to the Union's citizens: the majority of states, coupled
with the majority of the population, wins. The Union's decision-
making capacity would be equally enhanced by further reducing
the scope of cases in which one member of the Council can veto
a decision. This is a system that can be (and indeed was)
conceived in a Community of six, but that can hardly be
sustainable in a Union of twenty-seven or thirty members.
B. A Better Rooting in the Member States to Be Understood Better
Building upon the previous Amsterdam and Nice Treaties,
the Lisbon Treaty strengthened the role that national
parliaments are called to play in the functioning of the Union.19
That should be fostered, pending the birth of a truly European
electorate, in order to promote closer links with the Member
States' legislatures, which are directly connected to the national
electorates, and hopefully to succeed, through those links, where
Member States' governments repeatedly failed: making the
European citizens feel more connected to and more concerned
by what happens at the European Union level, which is as
relevant to their own interests as what happens at the Member
State level.
In spite of repeating-since the Birmingham European
Council in October 1992, a few months after the failed Danish
referendum on the Maastricht Treaty-that it was a priority to
explain to citizens the process of European integration and to
inform them better about what European institutions do and
why, EU leaders never really did and occasionally preferred to
18. TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 11, art. 16(4), 2010 0.J. C 83, at 24; see alsoJEAN-
CLAUDE PIRIS, THE LISBON TREATY, A LEGAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 221-25 (2010).
19. TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 11, art. 12, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 21.
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blame the Union's institutions for not doing what clearly needed
to be undertaken at the ground level of each Member State. It is
self-evident that this task cannot be handled by the information
services of the Union's institutions, including their national
information offices (assuming that they finally join forces), which
can at best only coordinate existing national resources. It goes
without saying that such an information effort, which remains to
be launched twenty years on, would, if successful, help to avoid
recurrent misunderstandings about the nature and action of the
Union. It would also be of great relevance at a time when public
opinion in a more diversified Union tends to lose confidence in
and turn away from the European project.
It has, on the contrary, to be accepted that-at least for the
moment-the European Parliament has not been able, as one
could have hoped, to bridge the gap between the Union and its
citizens, whom the Parliament is supposed to directly represent
but who show, every five years, that they feel less and less
concerned by that Parliament's elections. An end should be put
to the mantra that for years equated democratic legitimacy of the
Union's decision making to an ever enhanced role for the
European Parliament. That emerged-and was hardly ever
disputed-from a dramatic confusion between the Union's and
states' constitutional models regarding democratic control
powers and the need for citizens to be represented in legislation-
making and political control. The fact is that the European
Union is not a state, nor is it on its way to becoming one, and that
the European Parliament, in spite of its denomination, cannot be
likened to any elected national assembly (including in terms of
voter turnout), and, in spite of being made to share budgetary
and legislative powers and to censor the Commission, has no
power to call the Council to account.
The misunderstanding should also cease about the Council
lacking democratic legitimacy. Its action results from the
combined will of its members, which are all representatives of
democratically legitimate governments. The real source of
democratic legitimacy has, therefore, ultimately to be found in
the Member States, which ratified the founding treaties; hence
the importance of furthering the links with national parliaments
while recalling the responsibilities of national governments to
UNION IN THE ENLARGED EU?
make sure that the functioning of the Union's political system is
not wrongly perceived and that it is appreciated on its merit.
Things may change in the more or (rather) less near future,
and they may even evolve to a point where European issues are
debated and oriented through a larger and more direct popular
participation. That is not the case at present, however, and it
hardly serves the interest of a better functioning Union to act as
if it were-and should accordingly function as-a state.
III. OPTION TWO: SHOULD 'MORE" LEAD TO "LESS," REVERT
TO "LESS" TO KEEP "MORE"
"[H]ow can we ensure that 'more' does not lead to 'less'?"
asked the above-mentioned report on the challenge of
enlargement that the Delors Commission submitted to the
Lisbon European Council in June 1992.20 The answer might well
be that there is no way to make sure that, in the end, that does
not happen. Even still, it must not necessarily mean settling for
"less." There would still be other ways to go, if there are Member
States willing to try them, in order to preserve the "more."
In an interview in early 2004, the then Commission
president Romano Prodi took the view that, had the treaty
reform proceedings remained blocked during that year, some
Member States could-or even should-take the initiative to go
forward with closer European integration.21 The Constitutional
Treaty was agreed upon six months later and indeed included
measures to strengthen the functioning of institutions in a Union
that had just enlarged to include ten more Member States,
although it never came into force because of the failed referenda
of 2005.22 No doubt, it would have been preferable that the
Union's structure be strengthened then; still, the Lisbon Treaty,
which was signed at the end of 2007 and entered into force two
years later, contains most of the substantive reforms previously
20. Challenge of Enlargement, supra note 1, at 14.
21. Andrea Bonnani, Intervista al Presidente della Commissione [Interview with the
President of the Commission], LA REPUBBLICA (Rome), Jan. 2, 2004, available at
http://www.repubblica.it/2004/a/sezioni/politica/euprod/euprod/euprod.html?ref=
search ("The Union train cannot always move forward at the speed of the slowest
wagon." (author's translation)).
22. See PIRIS, supra note 18, at 3, 24-25.
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envisaged.23 The question remains, however: Is the Union now
equipped to function in a satisfactory way, or are further
improvements still needed in that respect?
Some Member States might consider that a lesser level of
institutional efficiency-or a lesser level of political ambition that
might flow from it-are acceptable (if not welcome), notably if,
for instance, the prospect of a less efficient Commission is
balanced with the prospect of not being able to retain a national
in that institution on a permanent basis. Some might not be too
concerned by the prospect of possibly diluting the original
supranational project into something closer to a classical
international organization; after all, that is the direction toward
which the Lisbon Treaty started steering, while leaving the basic
nature of the European Union untouched.24 Some, particularly
some new Member States, while accepting becoming part of the
"European family," might choose to give priority to national
traditions and independence over further European integration.
Finally, some Member States, though originally aiming for more
integration, might consider that the option of a new treaty
revision is not viable in the present political circumstances (not
least because of the need to inevitably go through more
referenda).
But would all Member States settle for that? They might not.
The idea that, in a larger membership group, every member
should not be bound to align on the lowest common
denominator was repeatedly expressed by German political
leaders. In the Summer 1994, Christlich Demokratische Union
und Christlich-Soziale Union manifesto, Karl Lammers and
Wolfgang Schauble first suggested that a "noyau dur" ("core
group") of Member States could move forward faster toward
European integration without pressuring those who could (or
would) not do the same; the proposal was notably intended to
make enlargement to the Central and Eastern European
countries easier and, although it did not go far due to the mild
(French) or negative (British and Italian) responses, as well as to
an overall distaste for the two-speed Europe idea, it nevertheless
had the merit to put in clear terms the question of the future of
23. Id. at 46-48 (assessing the treaty as reflecting a draw in the match between
"integrationists" and "co-operationists").
24. Id. at 328-31.
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European integration.25 In the Amsterdam Treaty, three years
later, Member States agreed instead on the "enhanced
cooperation" mechanism, 26 which was not meant to answer that
question but rather to keep any noyau dur away. In the speech he
delivered at the Berlin Humboldt University on May 12, 2000, the
German Foreign Affairs Minister Joschka Fischer took over the
noyau dur idea, in the broader framework of the progress toward
a European Federation; he namely considered the creation of a
"centre of gravity" as an essential step that a group of states could
take on the way to full political integration.27
While regarded as unrealistic until a few years ago, such an
option could be revived if a group of "like-minded" Member
States were to take the view that the prospect for European
integration is at risk of being diluted to the point of losing its
essential features and turning into something that would no
longer and in any way resemble that project.28 That would not
entail either a "variable geometry" approach-which is somewhat
already an in-built reality of the present treaties29-or an "A la
25. KARL LAMMERS & WOLFGANG SCHAUBLE, UBERLEGUNGEN ZUR EUROPAISCHEN
POLITIK [REFLECTIONS ON EUROPEAN POLICY] 5 (1994), available at www.cducsu.de/
upload/schaeublelamers94.pdf.
26. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, 1997 O.J. C 340/1, at
22-23.
27. Joschka Fischer, German Foreign Minister, From Confederacy to Federation-
Thoughts on the Finality of European Integration, Address at the Humboldt University
in Berlin (May 12, 2000), available at www.ena.lu/speech.joschkafischer.ultimate
objective european-integration- berlin. 12_2000-2-17984.
28. See Francois Mitterrand, President of France, Address before the European
Parliament (Jan. 17, 1995), reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON EUROPEAN UNION 298-99 (A.G.
Harryvan & J. Van der Harst, eds., trans., 1997) (emphasizing that he was "totally in
favour of enlargement to include the whole of democratic Europe" and adding, "I do
not wish the situation to arise that, when the last country joins, it joins something which
no longer exists, because it has been destroyed from within.").
29. Seventeen out of twenty-seven Member States share a single currency and have
to comply with rules, notably on price stability and budgetary discipline, that are specific
to eurozone countries; twenty-two Member States share with three non-EU countries
(Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland) the Schengen area, with no border control on the
movements of persons; not to mention the Lisbon Treaty provisions on permanent
structured cooperation in the field of defense. SVEN Biscop, PERMANENT STRUCTURED
COOPERATION AND THE FUTURE OF ESDP 5-6 (Royal Institute for International
Relations, Egmont Paper 20, 2008), available at http://www.egmontinstitute.be/
paperegm/ep20.pdf; Raymond J. Ahearn et al., The Future of the Eurozone and US.
Interests, EUR. UNION REP. BLOG (Jan. 31, 2011), http://european-union-
reports.blogspot.com/2011/01/future-of-eurozone-and-us-interests.html; The Schengen
Area and Cooperation, EUROPA (Mar. 8, 2009), http://europa.eu/legislationsummaries/
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carte" Europe,30 or even the use of the enhanced cooperation
treaty provisions. It would rather entail a new agreement between
the states concerned. Such a group of states would need to be
sufficiently homogeneous and "like minded" on a number of
essential issues (rather than on one single issue), which would
allow it to go ahead as a united group.
Could it be a group whose composition would more or less
correspond to that of the founding Member States? Or could it
take, as a starting point, the Eurozone Member States, as
qualified by a single approach on social and tax harmonization?
Or a combination of those? The existence of a jointly shared
common ground would in any case represent a sine qua non to
go down that road. It might certainly be argued that such a
homogeneous group would not be easy to identify; besides,
observing the political leadership in today's Union may suggest
that the conditions do not exist for such a development to occur.
However, that is no reason that it could not happen, in the near
future, under changed political conditions: the catalyst could be,
for instance, the inability to agree on measures largely regarded
as essential for the economic health of the Union or to react to
an external event that calls for a jointly agreed-upon Union
stand.3 1
A "core-group" would probably have to be sufficiently small
to encompass a minimum common denominator. If it takes the
single currency as a starting point, its potential participants
justicejfreedom security/freemovement.of-persons-asylum-immigration/133020
en.htm.
30. It goes without saying that having different groups, established according to
specific projects (which each state would choose), would go against the idea of unity that
underlies the European integration project and would run against, rather than help
preserve, that project.
31. At the time of this Essay, newspaper headlines commented on the
Competitiveness Pact that the German Chancellor and the French President brought to
the European Council on February 4, 2011. See, e.g., Carlo Bastasin, Europa dei Governi
senza Unione [European Union without Governments], IL SOLE 24 ORE, Feb. 11, 2011,
http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/commenti-e-idee/2011-02-11 /europa-governi-senza-
unione-063851.shtml?uuid=AaRvgK7C; The Union within the Union, ECONOMIST, Feb. 12,
2011, at 62; Philips Stephens, All Aboard for a Two-Speed Europe, FIN. TIMES (London),
Feb. 11, 2011, at 9. The first reactions to the Competitiveness Pact pointed to its
intergovernmental nature, tending to forget that all founding treaties proceed from the
same approach; that is, sovereign states getting together to agree on common objectives
and on the means to achieve them. The early comments, however, only provide evidence
that a two-speed Europe can no longer be regarded as pure speculation.
UNION IN THE ENLARGED EU?
would then have to make sure that they at least share the same
approach on social and tax harmonization, possibly on a few
basic elements of foreign policy and, above all, on the future of
European integration. Members of a "core-group" would
continue to share actions and institutions with the larger group,
and they could organize institutionally by somehow replicating
the existing EU structure.
In this respect, the treaty provisions on enhanced
cooperation could hardly provide any help, as they may only be
used by a group of Member States for a given action in a given
area, subject to several conditions and procedures, and make
such cooperation subject, in the end, to the will of the other
Member States. Quite the contrary, the above approach would
flow from the conviction of a group of Member States that the
treaty framework no longer allows, in a too heterogeneous
Union, a proper realization of the integration project launched
in the 1950s in Paris and Rome and confirmed, forty years later,
in Maastricht. That approach would thus inevitably imply going
beyond the existing treaties.
This is where this Essay ends, as its purpose is not to go into
the details of the legal modalities according to which that could
be realized. No doubt, Jean-Claude Piris' current reflections will
be of the utmost value and provide helpful input for any further
thinking in this respect.
It would however be essential for any initiative of that kind
to take the necessary legal precautions to avoid-as Joschka
Fischer had stressed in his Berlin speech-putting the European
Union acquis in jeopardy and to make sure that any "core group"
does not have the effect of fragmenting the efforts of Europe at
large to cope with the global challenges it has to face. As long as
it is not created as an exclusive club, but remains open to any
Union Member State that would come to share its objectives, a
"core group" could eventually turn out to be a catalyst.32
32. Reginald Dale, commenting about the outcome of the 1993 Danish
referendum, qualified two-speed Europe:
[A] two-speed Europe really started with the birth of the Community in the
1950s, when only six states took the plunge and the others, led by Britain, held
back. The lesson from the past is that as long as there are enough countries
ready and able to press ahead, they must lead, and others-including Britain
again, if necessary-will eventually follow.
2011] 1285
1286 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 34:1269
CONCLUSION
European integration is by its own definition an integration
project and a political one-a project that Jean-Claude Piris
would define as "the most noble cause in history" > and one that
aims to create an "ever closer union" between the peoples of the
states that are party to it.
That project-whether it is called "federal" or "quasi-
federal," whether it draws inspiration from state or confederation
experiences-is one that has pursued, for over sixty years, more
(and not less) integration and should accordingly not be allowed
to be diluted into something less political than it has become.
The European Union was not established, twenty years ago, to be
turned back into a single market or a free exchange zone, nor to
be the European Community again, but to be more than that,
and to grow further. European integration is a work in progress
and as such it should be allowed to progress. Enlargement could
conceivably not turn out to be an obstacle to that. Although the
best option would always be for the Union to keep strong and
united while welcoming new members, a lower level of political
ambition should not be the price to pay in return for
enlargement.
The European Union that was born in Maastricht should
remain the reference, not least because that is to what new
European countries have in turn adhered. That European Union
is therefore what one should turn-and return-to, should the
need ultimately arise to make a new start, on a smaller scale, in
order to preserve the European integration original project.
Reginald Dale, Thinking Ahead: The Danes Got It Right Twice, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1993,
available at http://Aww.nytimes.com/1993/05/21/business/worldbusiness/21iht-
think.html.
33. See PIRIS, supra note 18, at 339 ("The European project is the most noble cause
in history, as its primary and essential aim is reconciliation and peace among peoples
who have fought each other for centuries.").
34. TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 11, pmbl., 2010 O.J. C 83, at 16.
